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WHO DECIDES WHAT NUMBER OF CHILDREN IS
―RIGHT‖?
June Carbone*
I agree with Professors Cahn and Collins that ―eight is enough.‖1 I am
perhaps more skeptical than they are about assisting Nadya Suleman, a
mother who already has six children, to have more. I wonder whose funds
financed fertility treatments for a single, unemployed mom on disability
benefits, and, perhaps even more critically, who will fund the children‘s
ongoing care. I am certainly concerned about the dubious ethical standards
of the doctor who provided the reproductive care. But I also have serious
reservations about anyone choosing to impose my views—or those of others—on the country as a whole.
I therefore applaud Professors Cahn and Collins for leading with the
question, ―Should we regulate?‖ and for framing their proposals in the context of a principled distinction between regulations of the type that tend to
be federally regulated in other contexts (how many embryos to implant in a
single in vitro procedure, for example) and personal decisions better left to
individual autonomy (such as whether a single mother ought to have more
children). I fear, however, that although the distinction they draw is principled and in many ways persuasive, it is a line unlikely to stick and unlikely to fully address the ethical framework for reproductive technologies if in
fact it does take hold.
My concerns do not proceed from any reflexive libertarianism. I do
not reject government regulations per se, nor do I believe that the market,
through the magic of the unseen hand, will necessarily correct misguided
decisions to implant six embryos in an unemployed thirty-two-year old. Instead, I question the framework Cahn and Collins develop for determining
when and what type of regulation is appropriate. I argue for a dynamic
theory of regulation, informed by the concept of evolutionary economics,
that would ask not just what kind of regulations are needed, but also how
regulatory implementation is likely to affect who becomes a patient, what
kinds of doctors are likely to provide the services they seek, and where and
when medical treatment is likely to occur. This analysis is dynamic—and
evolutionary—not in a biological sense, but in the sense that it anticipates
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how change in one arena, such as the expansion of insurance coverage,
might affect another area, such as the number of embryos likely to be implanted or the need to regulate issues not of concern in today‘s fertility
practices. In short, I am more concerned about whether fertility clinics locate in Detroit or Windsor, whether President Obama or a Georgia governor
appoints the regulators, and whether Ms. Suleman can afford in vitro fertilization at all than I am with having a government official stop the next doctor willing to implant too many embryos.
I.

STATIC REGULATION: BAD MOTHERS, GREEDY DOCTORS, AND
CHILDREN AS EXTERNALITIES
Two types of discourses justify regulation—and both tend to be relatively ―static‖ forms of analysis. That is, they diagnose a problem, explain
why the existing decision-makers are unlikely to get it right, and then propose regulation as the solution, without comparing the differences between
how a regulated versus unregulated system might evolve over time. The
first of these forms of analysis, grounded in bioethics, informs Cahn‘s and
Collins‘s arguments. It proceeds from the premise that medical decisionmaking should respect patient autonomy.2 It then justifies restrictions on
that autonomy in terms of the interests of third parties—the children of reproductive technology and the public who may ultimately pay for their
care—that are otherwise unrepresented in private decisions between doctors
and prospective parents.3
The second discourse parallels the first. Conventional economic analysis also justifies regulation when market decisions impose costs on third
parties.4 The economic analysis focuses on ―greedy‖ doctors; they may
gain patients if their success in producing babies improves, but if birth defects also increase, they do not report or bear the consequences of the defects.5 The analysis also considers ―bad‖ mothers and prospective parents,
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Id. at 505.
Id. at 506 & n.29.
4
See, e.g., Steve P. Calandrillo, Responsible Regulation: A Sensible Cost-Benefit, Risk Versus Risk
Approach to Federal Health and Safety Regulation, 81 B.U. L. REV. 957, 973 (2001). As Calandrillo
explains:
Optimal regulatory policy must therefore focus on the principle that the very justification for government intervention is the presence of an externality that the
market has failed to correct on its own. In brief, ―externalities‖ are any benefits
or costs caused by one party but borne by others. If a factory produces socially
useful widgets but emits pollution that is not reflected in the cost of the product, a
negative externality is imposed on all of the people living near the factory. The
only way to reduce or eliminate such an externality—assuming the market cannot—is to shift the cost back to the polluter through government regulation.
Id.
5
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especially those who have already undergone unsuccessful fertility treatments, who may discount the risk of birth defects due to their fear that they
will have no children at all and their concern that they will be unable to afford additional rounds of in vitro fertilization if the current effort fails.6 The
discourse concludes that children with birth defects are ―externalities‖—the
doctor and prospective parent who make decisions in the current system
about how many embryos to implant do not bear the full costs (and therefore do not internalize) the costs of the birth defects that may result from
multiples.7 Because private decision-making cannot fully account for all of
the interests affected by reproductive technologies, it should not be trusted
to regulate the field.
Once this analysis has been conducted—once Cahn and Collins, for
example, balance ―an individual‘s interest in becoming a parent‖ against
―society‘s interests in healthy children‖ and conclude that the number of
embryos to be implanted should be limited8—the discussion usually ends. I
give Cahn and Collins credit for their suggestion that with greater regulation should come more assistance with financing, and for their proposal for
more generous insurance coverage. I am also impressed that they consider
the possibilities that more regulation will either go beyond the limits they
set or inspire a flight to less regulated locales. What their analysis does not
do, however, is create a dynamic framework for considering the implications of their regulatory approach.
II. DYNAMIC REGULATION: GEORGIA ON MY MIND
A dynamic approach to regulation would ask not just whether regulation can be justified, but also how the adoption of regulation may transform
the nature of the transactions being regulated, and how that transformation
might compare with the continued evolution of the unregulated market.
Evolutionary economics, which sees markets as complex adaptive systems
that change over time through a process of trial and error, provides tools
that can be used to consider what the process might look like.9 Evolutionary analysis differs from other forms of dynamic analysis10 in that it focuses, in particular, on the mechanisms that produce variation and the
processes likely to select and reinforce some variants over others. Accordingly, such analysis considers the creation of reinforcing virtuous and vinote that fertility doctors are in competition with doctors from other clinics to report high success rates.
Thus, whether or not they are ―greedy,‖ they experience pressure to improve the odds of pregnancy.
6
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See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994).

http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2009/33/

111

NO RT HW E ST ER N U NI VE RSI T Y LAW RE VIE W C O LLOQ UY

cious cycles,11 and pays particular attention to how a particular regulation
will change the composition of who (agents such as doctors and patients),
what (processes), where (jurisdictions), and when the affected activities occur. Ironically, considered in terms of evolutionary economics, Cahn‘s and
Collins‘s almost offhand suggestion of expanded insurance coverage becomes significantly more important than the proposals to limit the number
of embryos, because expanded insurance is more likely to change the mix
of patients, doctors, and regulators involved with treatment. To explain, I
reverse the order of analysis, starting with the question of where regulation
is likely to be enacted, and how it may affect where fertility treatments occur.
A. Where?
Deliberations in the Georgia legislature on a bill to limit the number of
embryos implanted illustrate the concerns that underlie Cahn‘s and Collins‘s approach. Senator Ralph Hudgens, a Georgia legislator known for his
anti-abortion stance, introduced the legislation, with comments on Suleman:
―She is not married . . . . She is unemployed, she is on government assistance and now she is going to put those 14 children on the back of the taxpayers in the state of California.‖12 Critics characterized the bill, which
would have both limited the number of embryos implanted (two for women
younger than forty) and restricted the use of embryos in stem cell research,
as a backdoor effort to outlaw abortion. Fertility industry lobbyists quickly
derailed the measure, emphasizing that it would increase costs and decrease
success rates. One Atlanta fertility doctor, for example, told the press,
―What this bill will effectively do is shut us down . . . . Patients seeking reproductive care in Georgia will go to Tennessee or South Carolina or Alabama. They will just leave.‖13
The Georgia debate underscores the fact that fertility treatments take
place in a decentralized, competitive industry—and that legislatures respond to a variety of constituents who may not necessarily have infant
health as their primary concern. Doctors implant multiple embryos because
it increases the likelihood that at least one baby will be born, and higher ini11
See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102 MICH.
L. REV. 71 (2003) (discussing the role of reciprocity and trust in creating reinforcing cycles). Karen Alter refers to a vicious cycle in the legal context as one that creates reinforcing patterns that undermine
law enforcement, explaining that ―[t]he more the law is flouted, the more law is instrumentalized to justify state actions, the less legitimate law and the judicial process are in the eyes of individuals or governments and the less states and individuals believe in the sanctity of law or the rule of law.‖ KAREN
ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW 211 (2001), In contrast, in the virtuous
cycle, ―[t]he more rules are respected by all, the greater the willingness of citizens and governments to
play by the rules.‖ Id. at 218.
12
Georgia “Octomom Bill” Would Limit Embryo Implants, CNN.COM, Mar. 3, 2009,
http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/03/03/georgia.octomom.bill/index.html (link).
13
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tial success rates lower costs.14 If the Georgia legislation had the effect of
either lowering the success rates or raising the costs of Georgia clinics, they
would lose out to clinics elsewhere. Indeed, some clinics already have multiple offices in different states and even different countries, and could easily
shift their practices to other jurisdictions to accommodate the demand.15
Accordingly, even regulation at the national level, if it made U.S. clinics
less competitive, could simply fuel the movement of more clinics to the Caribbean.
Cahn and Collins propose increasing insurance coverage expressly to
deal with that concern. They reason that if insurance coverage makes multiple cycles more affordable, it will make regulation limiting the number of
embryos implanted more feasible.16 Indeed, empirical evidence suggests
that greater insurance coverage may prompt fewer high-order multiples
even without express limitations.17 They are right that a change in the
source of financing may facilitate effective oversight of the number of embryos implanted, but the tail is wagging the dog. Comprehensive insurance
coverage has dramatically further-reaching implications than a restriction
on the number of embryos to be implanted. A proposal for more extensive
insurance coverage should therefore stand or fall on its own merits. Let us
start an investigation of the issues expanded insurance coverage might raise
with the question of where it is to be made available.
Today, regulation of medical procedures takes place at the national
level, but insurance regulation is a state activity. Some states already compel coverage for fertility treatments, or require that employers at least offer
such coverage.18 These regulations, however, cannot be comprehensive because, among other things, they vary in what they cover and are often
preempted by federal legislation. Therefore, the regulations do not cover all
health plans even in those states in which they apply.19
To be effective, insurance coverage would have to be mandated nationally. Yet, in vitro fertilization involves expenses that can start at between $10,000 and $15,000 per cycle, cost up to $100,000 per patient,
address the needs of only a small percentage of women with infertility issues, and disproportionately benefit the most privileged Americans (who
14

Monahan, supra note 6, at 169–70.
For a discussion of fertility tourism generally, see G. Pennings, Reproductive Tourism as Moral
Pluralism in Motion, 28 J. MED. ETHICS 337 (2002) (link).
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18
Id. at 183. Eleven states require varying degrees of coverage: Arkansas, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and West Virginia.
Id. at 183 n.221.
19
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are more likely to defer childbearing and are the most likely to seek out
treatment).20 The justification for such coverage, particularly without comprehensive health care reform, has to be based on something more than a
desire to regulate the number of embryos implanted more effectively.
B. What?
Underlying Cahn‘s and Collins‘s approach is a sensible notion: more
extensive regulation should lead to more extensive subsidies. Right now,
the fertility industry rests on an implicit tradeoff. On the one hand, we lack
comprehensive regulation in part because whenever restrictions are proposed that might command consensus, such as some limit on the number of
embryos implanted, the debate quickly expands, as it did in Georgia, to include intractable issues such as the moral status of the embryo or limits on
reproductive access for single women.21 On the other hand, with little regulation—and no subsidy—the industry is limited to wealthier (and relatively
sophisticated) patients and doctors in small practices willing to forego the
more secure income that comes with insurance coverage.22 These doctors
and patients operate largely below the public radar (at least until a Nadya
Suleman garners publicity) with limited oversight. The result is a flourishing industry in which many clinics discriminate against same-sex couples,
AIDS sufferers, and single men, while others cater specifically to gays and
lesbians, and others still aid anyone who walks in the door—and can pay.23
It is also an innovative industry that often experiments with new techniques
earlier than other places in the world. Nonetheless, as Jaime King observes:
The absence of federal research funding has pushed reproductive genetics out of the laboratory and into medical
practice. Advances in reproductive technology, such as
PGS [preimplantation genetic screening], have been widely
achieved on the basis of theory-driven rather than datadriven hypotheses, given the lack of funds for research and
the absence of legislation that requires safety and efficacy
research prior to clinical use. As a result, couples often
have to make treatment decisions with little evidence of
20
See Debora L. Spar, Where Babies Come From: Supply and Demand in an Infant Marketplace,
HARV. BUS. REV., Feb. 2006, at 133, 135 (reporting that ―[o]nly thirty-six percent of infertile women in
the United States seek medical assistance in conceiving, . . . and only one percent of women try IVF or
other high-tech treatments‖) (link to abstract).
21
For discussions of the lack of regulation, see, e.g., FRANCIS FUKUYAMA & FRANCO FURGER,
BEYOND BIOETHICS: A PROPOSAL FOR MODERNIZING THE REGULATION OF HUMAN BIOTECHNOLOGIES
293–300 (2006); Lars Noah, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Pitfalls of Unregulated Biomedical Innovation, 55 FLA. L. REV. 603 (2003).
22
On the characteristics of the industry, see generally Spar, supra note 20, at 133–35.
23
See Susan B. Apel, Access to Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 12 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L.
33 (2008) (link).
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safety and efficacy, and policymakers have little data to
suggest a need for regulation.24
Cahn‘s and Collins‘s proposal to expand insurance coverage rejects
this tradeoff. They write that ―[i]nfertility is one of the most difficult life
challenges an individual can encounter, and we believe we must do more to
facilitate access to treatment.‖25 But why, what, and for whom? I am sympathetic to the claim that insurance coverage should extend to reproductive
procedures on at least the same basis as the coverage of Viagra as a matter
of basic equality for women. Nonetheless, I am bothered at least as much
as Senator Hudgens by the prospect that my health insurance premiums
might rise in order to cover fertility treatments for a woman who already
has six children, and though I agree with Cahn and Collins that the government should not restrict the ability of any man or woman to reproduce, I am
not so sure that insurance funds should be available irrespective of ―preexisting family size, the financial resources available to care for any children
born as a result of ART, or the marital status or sexual orientation of potential patients.‖26 Moreover, with mandated insurance coverage and no additional funds for research, the question of what treatments will be covered,
and which deemed experimental, will likely become more intense.27
Current regulations restricting the implantation of multiple embryos
rest on the health implications for the children that may result from in vitro
procedures. Extending insurance coverage to fertility treatments on a comprehensive basis at either the federal or the state level necessarily involves a
more complex calculus—such regulation must also consider whose reproduction should be subsidized (or more accurately cross-subsidized by those
contributing to the premiums). And if the interests of children can be taken
into account in making a decision about overseeing medical procedures,
why should the interests of taxpayers (or other healthcare consumers) not be
considered in deciding whose reproduction should not only be tolerated, but
encouraged and paid for by others?
C. Who?
Comprehensive funding for reproductive technologies must address the
types of technologies that should be encouraged, and defining types of coverage raises the issue of for whom they should be encouraged. The issue of
―who,‖ as the subject rather than the object of the sentence, however, raises
a different set of issues. Expansion of insurance coverage could potentially
24

Jaime King, Predicting Probability: Regulating the Future of Preimplantation Genetic Screening,
8 YALE J. HEALTH POL‘Y L. & ETHICS 283, 322 (2008).
25
Cahn & Collins, supra note 1, at 511.
26
Id. at 511–12.
27
See Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 8 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 807, 825–28 (2007) (Elizabeth
Meltzer ed.).
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change the dynamics of the industry in fundamental ways, and it would do
so in large part because it would change the character of the medical practice, the patients, and the level of oversight appropriate and possible for
both.
First, consider the doctors. With comprehensive insurance coverage,
fertility physicians, once considered the cowboys of the medical profession,28 would become much more like other doctors. On the one hand, this
should make them more responsive to professional norms. On the other
hand, it may also make them more risk averse when dealing with controversial patients. Doctors who willingly treat single women today, for example,
might hesitate to do so if they were associated with a religious or community hospital embarrassed by the association with an unemployed single
mother, even one who gives birth to a single child instead of octuplets.29
Second, the effects of broader insurance coverage would vary with
changes in the composition of the patient group. Existing insurance mandates appear not to have increased access to ART to a significant degree,
apparently because those with access to employer-funded health insurance
already have the resources to pay for treatment.30 If Cahn‘s and Collins‘s
reforms are similar in scope to those already existing in some states, the net
effect would be to disproportionately benefit the most advantaged of those
already using fertility services. If, on the other hand, the reforms succeeded
in expanding the patient population, many people who today would not
consider fertility treatments because they could not afford them would seek
access, increasing the importance of issues that may be of less concern today. For example, an expanded patient group might be less sophisticated
than the current one, raising the need for more consumer protection measures. Or, it might be less healthy, raising issues about the effectiveness of
treatment.31
Third, a new set of actors will be introduced into the ART process—
most notably, insurance companies. Insurance companies will likely want
to restrict eligibility, as they already do with respect to existing policies, arguing that ―(1) infertility is not an ‗illness‘; (2) artificial insemination is not
a ‗treatment‘; and (3) infertility treatment is not ‗medically necessary,‘‖ or
28
Alexander N. Hecht, The Wild Wild West: Inadequate Regulation of Assisted Reproductive Technology, 1 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL‘Y 227 (2001).
29
See NAOMI R. CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES: WHY THE FERTILITY MARKET NEEDS LEGAL
REGULATION 58–59, 97, 141–44 (2009) (discussing barriers to treatment).
30
Judith F. Daar, Accessing Reproductive Technologies: Invisible Barriers, Indelible Harms, 23
BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 18, 37 (2008).
31
Michele Goodwin observes that exposure to environmental toxins and sexually transmitted diseases increase the risk of infertility. Michele Goodwin, Prosecuting the Womb, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1657, 1718–19 (2008) (link). Marcia Inhorn and Michael Hassan Fakih indicate that both factors disproportionally affect minority women in the United States. Marcia C. Inhorn & Michael Hassan Fakih,
Arab Americans, African Americans, and Infertility: Barriers to Reproduction and Medical Care, 85
FERTILITY & STERILITY 844, 845–46 (2006). See also CAHN, supra note 29, at 141 (describing infertility rates among minorities).

http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2009/33/

116

104:109 (2009)

Who Decides What Number of Children is “Right?”

that specific treatments are experimental.32 Moreover, insurers are likely to
define single women and same-sex partners as not suffering from an illness
and therefore not eligible for coverage. The more that access depends on
insurance coverage and the more that it becomes a matter of routine for
some, the more that coverage for others is likely to become a matter of contention.
All this suggests that a subsidized industry, whether subsidized directly
or through insurance premiums, will be one with different doctors, different
patients, and different regulatory issues than the one that exists today. Cahn
and Collins raise the concern that ―opening the door to any kind of government interference in fertility treatments will also open the door to restrictions on ART access . . . .‖33 In a transformed industry, however, decisions
about access will be inevitable. Private clinics often discriminate now, but
the refusal by any given clinic to treat a patient does not necessarily result
in a total denial of care. For many, however, the denial of insurance coverage would preclude treatment, and give rise to calls for more legislation to
prohibit—or impose—such limitations. What are now small-scale private
decisions will become large, publicly debated ones, carrying higher stakes
for the patient.34
D. When?
Finally, any substantial expansion of medical insurance coverage in the
context of a U.S. health care system that does not provide basic coverage
for millions of Americans is likely to be exceptionally controversial. Accordingly, a comprehensive proposal should be evaluated in the context of
the Obama Administration‘s overall approach to comprehensive health care
reform. The costs of such an expansion in coverage would almost certainly
be weighed in terms of the affordability of other reforms—but overall provision for health care is the context in which these regulatory decisions take
place, and it is the appropriate framework for such decisionmaking.
III. CONCLUSION: SURVIVAL OF THE FITTEST POLICIES?
Cahn and Collins are right to connect proposals for the regulation of
assisted reproduction with expansions in mandated insurance coverage and
limitations on the ability of doctors to determine their patients‘ ability to reproduce. They are certainly correct that the issues are intertwined, and that
changes in one area will increase the importance of changes in the other
areas. They are also right that the American failure to systematically address either the reproductive needs of a significant part of the population or
32

Meltzer, supra note 27, at 826.
Cahn & Collins, supra note 1, at 511.
34
In addition, state legislatures that mandate insurance coverage may also condition it on marital
status. For an examination of such efforts, see Daar, supra note 30, at 43–48.
33
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the abuses that result from an industry with so little oversight is inexcusable.
At the same time, once the combination of expanded insurance coverage and systematic regulation is in place, the implications will be far broader than regulating how many embryos to implant. Left untouched in this
discussion are such controversial issues as how and when to allow the adoption of new procedures. Will the new regulations, for example, permit use
of preimplantation genetic diagnosis not only to determine potential diseases, but also to increase the chances of a successful pregnancy? 35 Will the
government help fund studies to determine the safety of new procedures?
Will it address the storage, donation, and destruction of embryos—a politically incendiary issue in many legislatures?
The largest criticism I have of the Cahn and Collins argument is that
their suggestion that we should regulate the number of embryos implanted
is far too narrow a framework in which to decide whether to go down the
path of comprehensive insurance financing and public regulation—a path
that will transform the dynamics of the industry. The issue of embryo implantation may be one where the current world of lightly regulated practices
works much better than press accounts indicate. As evidence that voluntary
professional regulation is inadequate, Cahn and Collins cite statistics that
4% of IVF cycles still involve implantation of four or more embryos. 36
What they do not say is that for women under the age of thirty-five, the percent receiving four or more has fallen from 64% of IVF cycles in 1996 to
3% in 2006. The number of triplets implanted also fell from a high of 50%
in 1998 to 16% in 2006, while the number of singleton implantations has
risen from the de minimis level to 7%.37 In other words, the current unregulated world of fertility practice is not static. Despite the incentives to implant multiple embryos, professional guidelines and the shift in medical
practices have done a remarkable job in reducing the number of multiples
who result from assisted reproduction. Suleman‘s octuplets are the outliers;
the difficult issue is that 75% of implantations are with two embryos,38 undertaken, in part, because many fertility patients want twins.39 I am dubious
whether it is worth the transformation of the entire industry in order to limit
the small remaining number of excessive implantations.

35

See King, supra note 24.
Cahn & Collins, supra note 1, at 510.
37
See U.S. DEP‘T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 2006 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY
SUCCESS RATES 71 (2008), available at http://www.cdc.gov/ART/ART2006/508PDF/2006ART.pdf
(link).
38
Id.
39
Astrid Højgaard, Lars D.M. Ottosen, Ulrik Kesmodel, Hans Jakob Ingerslev, Patient Attitudes
Towards Twin Pregnancies and Single Embryo Transfer—A Questionnaire Study, 22 HUM. REPROD.
2673 (2007) (finding that most patients treated for infertility preferred to have twins (58.7%) rather than
one child (37.9%)), available at http://humrep.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/22/10/2673 (link).
36
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Instead, I would like to see the debate over financing reform conducted
on terms of its own in accordance with an evolutionary analysis that takes
into account the forces such measures are likely to unleash. Cahn and Collins are clearly troubled by the inequalities in access to fertility treatments.
Broadening access as part of wholesale health care reform is a worthy objective, and it should be proposed together with calls for greater regulation.
If more comprehensive financing were to become available, greater oversight would become easier, and to some degree inevitable. It would still
leave room, however, for an intense—and I suspect quite different—debate
on how to decide how many children are ―enough.‖
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